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Abstract
We show a standard model where the optimal tax reform is to cut labor taxes and leave
capital taxes very high in the short and medium run. Only in the very long run would
capital taxes be zero. Our model is a version of Chamley’s, with heterogeneous agents,
without lump sum transfers, an upper bound on capital taxes, and a focus on Pareto
improving plans. For our calibration labor taxes should be low for the first ten to twenty
years, while capital taxes should be at their maximum. This policy ensures that all agents
benefit from the tax reform and that capital grows quickly after when the reform begins.
Therefore, the long run optimal tax mix is the opposite from the short and medium run
tax mix. The initial labor tax cut is financed by deficits that lead to a positive long run
level of government debt, reversing the standard prediction that government accumulates
savings in models with optimal capital taxes. If labor supply is somewhat elastic benefits
from tax reform are high and they can be shifted entirely to capitalists or workers by
varying the length of the transition. With inelastic labor supply there is an increasing
part of the equilibrium frontier, this means that the scope for benefitting the workers is
limited and the total benefits from reforming taxes are much lower.
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1 Introduction
A large literature on optimal dynamic taxation concludes that long run capital taxes
should be zero. This result, which originally goes back to Chamley (1986) and Judd
(1985), has been very resilient to many modifications of the basic model.1
That capital taxes should be so low is a controversial policy recommendation. Given
the highly skewed distribution of wealth it would seem that lowering capital taxes and
increasing labor taxes instead will necessarily hurt less wealthy taxpayers. But it is well
known that in standard models capital taxes should be zero in the long run even with
heterogeneous agents, and even if the government only considers policy allocations that
improve agents with very little wealth. Chamley (1986), Judd (1985) and Atkeson, Chari
& Kehoe (1999), provide results of this kind in different settings. In keeping with the
literature we call this the Chamley/Judd result.
One interpretation of this result has been that there is no equity/efficiency trade-off
involved in lowering capital taxes. It suggests that any opposition to lower capital taxes
can only be due to a lack of understanding of economics, or to a belief in myopic behavior
on the part of agents, or to inefficiencies of the political system that make it impossible
for the government to commit, or to some other failure of the basic model. Consequently,
many economists hold the view that introducing heterogeneity in models of optimal factor
taxation with infinitely-lived agents is a nuisance.2
Upon closer inspection we find that optimal factor taxation depends very much on
heterogeneity. If all agents have to benefit from a tax reform, optimal capital taxes
should be high and, in our main model, labor taxes should be very low during a very long
transition, between 10 and 20 years for our calibration. Only in the very long run should
capital taxes be zero.3
1The literature is very large, a fair summary would be quite long. A very incomplete summary of the
literature is that in the few cases where steady state optimal capital taxes are not zero they are often small or
even negative.
2Some papers consider taxation in heterogeneous agent models with exogenous policy, we mention a few in
the text. Optimal policy analysis in models with heterogeneous infinitely-lived agents is available, for example,
in Bassetto (1999) and Niepelt (2002), who study how taxes affect taxpayers of different wealth in a stochastic
model without capital; and Werning (2007) who studies redistribution with progressive taxation.
3Aiyagari (1995) showed that capital taxes should be positive in the long run due to capital overaccumu-
lation in a model with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets. We do not focus on this implication of
heterogeneous agents for two reasons. First because the result is tenuous, Chamley (2001) shows that depending
on the stochastic form of income shocks the long run capital tax should be negative; Marcet, Obiols-Homs &
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One implication of these results is that long run properties of optimal policies should
not be used for policy recommendations, since an optimal reform calls for many years of
very low labor taxes and high capital taxes, the exact opposite of the long run recommen-
dation.
Our results are complementary to some papers already hinting that the transition of
optimal policy is very important in models of heterogeneous agents. These papers estab-
lish that in models of heterogeneous agents large parts of the population would suffer a
large utility loss if capital taxes were suddenly abolished. Relevant references are Garcia-
Mila`, Marcet & Ventura (1995) (a model without uncertainty and calibration according to
wage/wealth ratios), Correia (1995) (some analytic results), Domeij & Heathcote (2004)
(a model with incomplete markets), Conesa & Krueger (2006) (with overlapping genera-
tions), and Flode´n (2006) (policy designed optimally for one of the agents). The results of
these contributions stand in stark contrast to Lucas (1990), who showed that the welfare
of a representative agent would increase if capital taxes were abolished immediately and
all tax revenue were obtained by taxing only labor. Thus, while designing the transition
of capital/labor taxes optimally may not be very important with homogeneous agents,
with heterogeneous agents there is indeed an important equity/efficiency trade-off and
optimally designing the policy along the transition is crucial in resolving this issue.
Our results may also provide some insights for the political economy literature. Capital
taxes in the real world are indeed very high, between 40% and 70% (after depreciation
allowances) depending on the measurements. Having the Chamley/Judd result in mind
this might seem like a failure of the institutions that, in the real world, determine fiscal
policy. Indeed some papers in the political economy literature are able to explain high
taxes as an outcome of frequent voting. One might conclude that low level of capital taxes
should be part of an immutable constitution. But, in the light of our results, high capital
taxes can be part of an optimal reform and they are not necessarily a failure of a political
system. The puzzle now would become, why are labor taxes so high?.
Our results are further in line with the literature on gradualism of political reforms,
Weil (2007) argue that a similar result holds when introducing endogenous labor supply. Second, the result
is specifically for the ”veil of ignorance” welfare function, it may not hold for other welfare functions. Thus,
because our aim is to study the transition, so we prefer to stay within a model where the zero long run optimal
capital tax result holds.
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which has been at the center of some policy debates.4 The very long period of high capital
taxes we find can be seen as a gradual reform designed to ensure that all agents improve
their welfare.
We derive our results in a model very close to Chamley’s benchmark, but with het-
erogeneous agents, without lump sum transfers, with an upper bound on capital taxes
below 100%, and with a focus on Pareto improving plans. These features first of all create
a meaningful equity-efficiency trade-off. Moreover, the restriction to Pareto improving
allocations is natural because the surprising part of the Chamley/Judd result is that long
run capital taxes should be zero even if the government improves all agents’ welfare.5
Aside from this literature-driven motivation, it seems that a sufficiently large and angry
minority can block a tax reform, or it may credibly threaten to overturn the reform in a
future vote, so that in order to change the taxation status quo a sufficiently large part of
the population should agree. While keeping as close as possible to Chamley, we deviate
from much of the optimal policy literature in explicitly studying the entire path of optimal
capital and labor taxes, and not only the steady state.6
In our model optimal capital taxes are still zero in the long run, as capital taxes will
be at the upper bound for N periods and then transit to zero in two periods. We find
that redistributive concerns cause the transition to be very long, capital taxes are high for
between ten and twenty years (for our calibration), depending on exactly which Pareto
improving allocation is selected. This long period of high capital taxes is needed in order
to raise more tax revenues from the ”capitalists” and less from the ”workers”; only then
all agents benefit from the tax reform.
To demonstrate the effects of heterogeneity in isolation we first study a model with a
completely inelastic labor supply. In this case the first best is achieved under homogeneous
agents by setting capital taxes to zero in all periods. But with heterogeneous agents capital
taxes should remain at their upper bound for a very long time before they are abolished.
4For example, the desirable speed of transition to market economies of formerly planned economies has been
extensively discussed both in policy and academic circles. Within this literature, closest to our approach is Lau,
Qian & Roland (2001) who show a gradual reform that improves all agents’ welfare.
5The recent work of Flode´n (2006) studies policies that are optimal only for one agent, thus Pareto improve-
ments are not necessarily achieved.
6Some papers have studied the transition in models of optimal policy. For example Jones, Manuelli & Rossi
(1993) study the transition in several homogeneous agent models.
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The reason is that zero capital taxes in all periods would leave ”workers” worse off than
in the status quo. Therefore, even though the planner has access to non-distortive labor
taxes he/she has to resort to distortive capital taxation to lower the workers’ tax bill.
The resulting total welfare losses are quite large, but they are needed to ensure a Pareto
improvement.
If labor supply is somewhat elastic capital taxes should also be very high for about
ten to twenty years before they are set to zero. But now we find that labor taxes should
be lower than status quo during this transition. Lower initial labor taxes increase labor
supply thus promoting growth in the early periods. With this policy the government
achieves a lower relative welfare loss.
An interesting aspect of these results is that the short-medium run optimal policy
(high capital taxes, low labor taxes) is exactly the opposite of the steady state (zero
capital taxes, high labor taxes). Ignoring the transition would yield very low welfare for
some agents, as found in the literature.7 This suggests that it is important to go beyond
steady state analysis in studies of optimal policy. Zero capital taxes in the long run are
only Pareto optimal and Pareto improving if they go along with high capital taxes and
low labor taxes during the transition.
We also report results for a welfare function that weighs equally both agents. This
is the most popular welfare function in the literature, it can be justified by assuming
the planner chooses under the ”veil of ignorance” or with probabilistic voting and equal
political power of both agents. It turns out that this policy is Pareto improving and that
it redistributes most of the welfare gains to the worker. The transition period of high
capital taxes and low labor taxes is very long, about 18 years.
In our main model government debt is positive in the long run. This is because the
government initially runs a deficit to finance the initial drop in labor taxes. The behavior
of long run debt is, therefore, the opposite from the standard case under capital taxation,
where the government often accumulates savings. In the face of the recently renewed
interest in studying the determinants of the optimal level of debt8 this shows that a
7As shown in Garcia-Mila` et al. (1995), Correia (1995), Domeij & Heathcote (2004), Conesa & Krueger
(2006) and Flode´n (2006).
8See Faraglia, Marcet & Scott (2006) and the references therein.
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positive level of government debt can be a by-product of an optimal reform.
Our focus on Pareto improvements leads to an analysis of the utility frontier of equi-
libria. This frontier is decreasing and concave in models without distortions, but as is
well known it may be non-well-behaved in models with proportional taxes. Interestingly,
in the fixed labor supply case the frontier of equilibria has an increasing part, even in the
range of equilibria that dominate the status quo, and the government can only leave the
capitalist in the status quo by pursuing a Pareto inefficient policy.
Many of our results are obtained numerically. To solve the model we need to take care
of some technical issues, including the fact that the heterogeneity parameters (the choice
variable λ defined below) have to be solved for separately, that the frontier of equilibria
may not be well-behaved, and the non-recursiveness on the solution induced by the tax
limit.
The main results are robust to various model and parameter changes. We also ex-
plore if progressive taxation might achieve the proper redistribution to ensure Pareto
improvements and avoid the distortions associated with high capital taxes. Finally, we
also numerically investigate the time consistency of our solutions. We find that the tax
reform is time consistent if it can only be overturned by consensus, therefore, heterogene-
ity builds in some time-consistency.9 However, if the planner reoptimizes in some future
date using a welfare function with fixed weights the policy is time inconsistent.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we lay out our baseline model and
discuss further the motivation for our assumptions. Section 3 discusses some properties
of the models obtained analytically, including a proof that capital taxes are zero in steady
state and about the form of the transition. We calibrate the heterogeneity parameters of
the two agents to the groups of highest and lowest 20% wealth/wage ratios. Our numerical
results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a model with two heterogeneous agents, discrete time, no uncertainty, Ramsey
equilibrium, capital accumulation. This is almost a special case of Chamley (1986), our
9This is a similar result to the one obtained analytically by Armenter (2004) for a simpler model.
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emphasis changes in four aspects relative to most of the literature:
i) We study the whole path for taxes, including the transition.
ii) We preclude agent-specific redistributive lump sum transfers. It is well known that
the Chamley/Judd result survives even in this case.10 This assumption seems reasonable
in a literature that has focussed on the effects of distorting taxation and because most
tax codes and indeed most constitutions stipulate that all individuals are equal in front
of the law.
iii) We search for allocations that improve everybody in the population. We therefore
calibrate the features of our two agent groups such as to represent the two extreme quintiles
of the population and study plans that are Pareto improvements under this calibration.
We also study the (veil of ignorance) case where the planner has a welfare function that
weighs each agent type according to the population share of each type.
iv) We impose an upper bound on capital taxes each period. Chamley (1986) and
Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) assume an upper bound of 100% for capital taxes in
all periods. Many other papers in the optimal taxation literature tend to simplify things
by assuming a bound only in the initial period. Optimal policies under these constraints
imply that capital taxes should be very high in the first few periods, much higher than
current actual capital taxes which, by all measures, are already very high. The initial tax
hike recommended by these models could have devastating effects on investment in the real
world if there is partial credibility of government policy, or if agents form their expectations
by learning from past experience.11 So, to avoid this tax hike in the initial periods we
use capital tax ceilings lower than 100%. In all of our computational exercises we fix
this ceiling to the status quo capital tax. Alternatively, this bound can be interpreted as
the value that avoids massive capital flight in an open economy with partial mobility of
10To our knowledge the first complete proof that capital taxes are zero in the long run even in the absence of
agent-specific lump sum redistribution is in section B1 of Chari & Kehoe (1999) also described in Atkeson, Chari
and Kehoe (1999). Chamley (1986) discusses the case of heterogeneous agents by considering a government
with a welfare function that weighs all agents linearly, this implicitly assumes there are redistributive lump sum
transfers. Judd (1985) considered a model where an agent has only capital income and another agent has only
wage income, so the distorting taxes in that paper are, in a way, agent-specific.
11Lucas (1990) offered a similar reasoning to motivate his study of a tax reform that abolishes capital taxes
immediately. Of course, one could infer from our discussion that issues such as credibility and learning should
be introduced explicitly in the analysis, instead of indirectly with the tax limit. Doing so would imply deviating
very much from Chamley’s model, but in this paper we prefer to stay as close as possible to that model in order
to understand the reason for our results. The time consistency literature deals, in a way, with the credibility
issue. An analysis of capital taxes under learning can be found in Giannitsarou (2006).
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capital.
In the following we present our model formally. We refer to Garcia-Mila` et al. (1995)
for some details on how to characterize competitive equilibria. For details on formulating
Ramsey equilibria and the primal approach in general, see Chari & Kehoe (1999) or
Ljunqvist and Sargent (2002).
2.1 The environment
There are two consumers j = 1, 2 with utility
∑∞
t=0 δ
t [u(cj,t) + v(lj,t)] where c is consump-
tion and l is labor of each agent each period. We assume u′ > 0, v′ < 0 and the usual
Inada and concavity conditions. Agents differ in their initial wealth kj,−1 and their labor
productivity φj . Agent j obtains income in period t from renting his/her capital at the
rental price rt and from selling his/her labor for a wage wtφj . Agents pay taxes at rates
τ lt on labor income and τ
k
t on capital income net of depreciation allowances. Therefore
period-t budget constraint of agent j is given by
cj,t + kj,t−1 = wt φj lj,t(1− τ lt ) + kj,t−1
[
1 + (rt − d)(1− τkt )
]
for j = 1, 2 (1)
Firms maximize profits, have a production function F (kt−1, et) where e is total effi-
ciency units of labor and k is total capital, F is concave, increasing in both arguments,
has constant returns to scale, Fk(k, e) → 0 as k → ∞, Fkk(k, e) < 0 for all e > 0 and
Fee(k, e) < 0 for all k > 0.
The government chooses capital and labor taxes, consumes g in every period, and has
the standard budget constraint. It saves in capital and has initial capital kg−1. Government
can get in debt, that is, kg can be negative. Ponzi schemes for consumers and government
are ruled out.
We normalize each agents’ mass to be 1/2. Market clearing conditions are
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1
2
2∑
j=1
φjlj,t = et (2)
kt = k
g
t +
1
2
2∑
j=1
kj,t
1
2
2∑
j=1
cj,t + g + kt − (1− d)kt−1 = F (kt−1, et) (3)
2.2 Competitive Equilibrium Conditions
The equilibrium concept is standard: consumers take prices and taxes as given, they
maximize their own utility, markets clear, and the budget constraint of the government
is satisfied. The first order conditions of optimality with respect to capital and labor for
consumer j are
u′(cj,t) = δ u′(cj,t+1)
(
1 + (rt+1 − d)(1− τkt+1)
)
(4)
− v
′(lj,t)
u′(cj,t)
= wt (1− τ lt ) φj (5)
for all t and j. Firms’ profit maximization implies that factor prices equal marginal
product: rt = Fk(kt−1, et) and wt = Fe(kt−1, et).
We also assume
u(c) =
c1−σc
1− σc v(l) = B
(1− l)1−σl
1− σl (6)
In this case FOC for capital and labor imply
c2,t
c1,t
= λ and
1− l2,t
1− l1,t = λ
σc
σl
(
φ2
φ1
) 1
σl
for all t (7)
for some λ that is constant through time.
Using (7) and standard steps of the primal approach one can show that (4), (5) and
the budget constraints of the consumer j for all t = 0, 1, ... can be summarized in the
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present value constraint12
∞∑
t=0
δt
u′(c1,t)
u′(c1,0)
(
cj,t − wt φj lj,t(1− τ lt )
)
= (8)
= kj,−1(1 + (r0 − d)(1− τk0 )) for j = 1, 2
Using (7) again one can show that necessary and sufficient conditions for a sequence{
c1t , kt, l
1
t
}
and a constant λ to be a competitive equilibrium are
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
u′(c1,t)c1,t + v′(l1,t) l1,t
)
= u′(c1,0) k1,−1(1 + (r0 − d)(1− τk0 )) (9)
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
u′(c1,t)λc1,t +
φ2
φ1
v′(l1,t) f(λ, l1,t)
)
= u′(c1,0) k2,−1(1 + (r0 − d)(1− τk0 ))(10)
and feasibility (3). Here f(λ, l1,t) is defined as
f(λ, l1,t) ≡ 1− (1− l1,t)λ
σc
σl
(
φ2
φ1
) 1
σl
(11)
and it gives l2,t that solves (7) for each possible value of the endogenous variables λ, l1t .
It is possible to show that as long as these conditions hold capital and labor taxes can be
found that ensure all first order conditions of agents hold. See Garcia-Mila` et al. (1995)
for details. Notice that condition (9) is standard for agent 1 in models of optimal policy
but that (10) is an analogous condition for agent 2 when equilibrium conditions (7) are
imposed. Note that the presence of heterogeneous agents implies that the ratio λ has to
be found optimally subject to the constraints (9) and (10).
Taxes are then found as a residual from (4) and (5). Consumption and labor of agent 2
are found from (7) and individual capital is backed out from the budget constraint period
by period.
2.3 Policy Objective and Constraints
We assume that the planner chooses Pareto optimal allocations. A standard argument
justifies that this is equivalent to assuming that the planner maximizes the utility of, say,
12Walras’ law guarantees that the budget constraint of the government is implied by the above equations plus
feasibility so it can be ignored.
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agent 1, subject to the constraint that agent 2 utility has a minimum value U2:
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(c2,t) + v(l2,t)] ≥ U2 (12)
where U2 is restricted so that the set of feasible competitive equilibria satisfying this
constraint is non-empty. Varying the value of the minimum utility U2 along all possible
utilities that can be achieved in equilibrium for agent 2 we can trace out the whole set of
Pareto efficient allocations.
We will concentrate our attention on allocations that are Pareto improving relative to
a certain status quo. Let U jSQ be the status quo utility obtained by agent j, achieved with
some taxation scheme that is already in place.13 Clearly these can be found by considering
only minimum utility values such that U2 ≥ U2SQ and such that the planner’s objective
at the maximum satisfies
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
u(c∗1,t) + v(l
∗
1,t)
] ≥ U1SQ
where ∗ denotes the optimized value of each variable for a given U2. We refer to these
Pareto optimal and Pareto improving plans as ”POPI” allocations. Proposition 2 below
will provide a way to compute all the utility values on the frontier and to select the POPI
allocations.
Finally, we introduce tax limits τkt ≤ τ˜ for all t = 0, 1, ..., ensuring that capital taxes
never go above a certain constant τ˜ exogenously given. Combining this limit with the FOC
for capital of the consumers it is easy to see that the tax limit is satisfied in equilibrium
if and only if
u′(c1,t) ≥ δ u′(c1,t+1) (1 + (rt+1 − d)(1− τ˜)) for all t > 0 and (13)
τk0 ≤ τ˜ (14)
The first equation ensures that the actual capital tax τkt for t = 1, 2, ... that is implied by
(4) satisfies the limit and it allows us to use use the primal approach where taxes do not
13The status quo utility, in general, depends on the distribution of capital at period -1, but we leave this
dependence implicit.
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appear explicitly in the constraints of the government.
2.4 The Lagrangian
As standard in the literature we look for a Ramsey equilibrium where the government
chooses an optimal sequence of tax rates and deficits, maximizes utility of agent 1 subject
to the constraint that taxes and prices have to be compatible with competitive equilibrium
and subject to the above additional constraints. The government has full credibility,
full commitment to the preannounced policy, both government and agents have rational
expectations. So, the government/planner solves
max
τk0 ,λ,{c1t ,kt,l1t}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(c1,t) + v(l1,t)]
s.t.
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(λc1,t) + v(f(λ, l1,t))] ≥ U2 (15)
and subject to feasibility (3) for all t, the implementability constraints (9) and (10) (for
period 0 only) and the tax limits (13), (14). Here, we used (7) and (11) to substitute
equilibrium c2, l2 out in (15). U2 has to satisfy the requirements discussed in the previous
subsection to achieve a Pareto improvement.
Notice that a special feature of this problem is that the constant λ has to be determined
as a feature of the optimal choice, therefore it appears as an argument in the maximization
problem.
Let α be the Lagrange multiplier of the minimum utility constraint (15), let ∆1,∆2 be
the multipliers of (9) and (10) normalized by u′(c1,0), and let γt be the Lagrange multiplier
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of (13), the Lagrangian for the government problem is
L =
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
u(c1,t) + v(l1,t) + α [u(λc1,t) + v(f(λ, l1,t)) ] +
∆1[ u′(c1,t)c1,t + v′(l1,t) l1,t ]+
∆2[ u′(c1,t)λc1,t +
φ2
φ1
v′(l1,t)f(λ, l1,t) ]+
γt[ u′(c1,t)− δ u′(c1,t+1)(1 + (rt+1 − d)(1− τ˜)) ]−
µt
(
1 + λ
2
c1,t + g + kt − (1− d)kt−1 − F (kt−1, et)
) ]
−W−αU2 (16)
where W = u′(c1,0)
[
[∆1k1,−1 +∆2k2,−1]
[
1 + (r0 − d)(1− τk0 )
] ]
. Further, γt, α ≥ 0 and
they satisfy the usual slackness conditions.
The first line of this Lagrangian has the usual interpretation: a Pareto efficient allo-
cation amounts to maximizing a welfare function where the planner weighs linearly the
utility of both agents, where the weight of agent 1 is normalized to one and the weight
of agent 2 is the Lagrange multiplier of the minimum utility constraint. However, it is
important that this α is not chosen arbitrarily in our setup, it has to be found to satisfy
the Pareto improving constraint (15). The next two lines ensure the budget constraints of
the consumers, the fourth line is the upper bound on capital taxes and the last line is the
feasibility constraint. The term W collects the period 0 terms in the budget constraints
of the consumers.
As is often the case in optimal taxation models the feasible set of sequences for the
planner is non-convex. This means that we will need to be careful about necessity and
sufficiency of first order conditions. We will be explicit about these issues in section 3.2.
First order conditions with respect to capital, labor and consumption are derived in a
standard way and they are shown in appendix A. In the rest of the section we comment on
features of these first order conditions that differ from other papers on dynamic taxation.
Since the relative consumption of agents λ is a choice we need to set the derivative of
13
L with respect to λ equal to zero, to obtain
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
α [ u′(λc1,t) c1,t + v′(f(λ, l1,t)) fλ(λ, l1,t)) ]+ (17)
∆2[ u′(c1,t) c1,t +
φ2
φ1
v′(l1,t) fλ(λ, l1,t) ]−
µt
2
[ c1,t − Fe(kt−1, et) φ2 fλ(λ, l1,t) ]
]
= 0
The fact that λ has to be chosen is a reflection of the fact that the government can vary
the ratio of consumptions of the agents by varying the total tax burden of labor or capital
in discounted present value.
The multipliers γ,∆1,∆2 have to satisfy the complementary slackness conditions. For
α (the multiplier of (15))
either α > 0 and
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(c2,t) + v(l2,t)] = U2
or α = 0 and
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(c2,t) + v(l2,t)] ≥ U2
In other words, the minimum utility constraint may or may not be binding. In the first
case the Lagrangian amounts to maximizing the weighted utility of agents 1 and 2 with
weight 1 and α, respectively. If the minimum utility constraint is NOT binding the planner
gives zero weight to agent 2. The latter case would only occur in models without frictions
if the planner would be willing to give a very low utility to agent 2, but we will see that
it occurs in our case even if the lower bound U2 is the status quo utility. This is because
even if α = 0 agent 2 will be consuming due to the fact that the allocations are determined
in equilibrium and the budget constraint of agent 2 has to be satisfied, insuring agent 2
some revenue for any policy action.
Similarly, for the γ’s and for each t, we have
either γt > 0 and u′(c1,t) = δ u′(c1,t+1)(1 + (rt+1 − d)(1− τ˜))
or γt = 0 and u′(c1,t) ≥ δ u′(c1,t+1)(1 + (rt+1 − d)(1− τ˜))
It turns out that the ∆i’s may be positive or negative, since the corresponding present
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value budget constraints have to be satisfied with equality. This becomes clear by looking
at the following interpretation. With two agents the marginal utility cost of distortive
taxation is ∂L
∂τk0
= u′(c1,0)[∆1k1,−1 +∆2k2,−1](r0 − d). Thus,
∆1k1,−1 +∆2k2,−1 ≥ 0
with the inequality being strict as long as any taxes are raised after the initial period.
This allows for one of the ∆i being negative, which will indeed be the case whenever the
constraints on redistribution that are imposed by the competitive equilibrium conditions
and the Pareto improvement requirement are sufficiently severe. To see this consider
a slightly modified model in which the social planner is allowed to redistribute initial
wealth between agents by means of a lump sum transfer T i such that T 1 = −T 2. All this
modification does to the Lagrangian is to change the implementability constraints such
that the term (∆1−∆2)T 1 is added inside the large bracket in the definition of W. Now
the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to the lump-sum transfer between agents is
∂L
∂T 1
= u′(c1,0)(∆1−∆2). For any given T 1, and in particular for T 1 = 0 as in our baseline
model, this expression is a measure of the marginal utility cost of the transfer not being
optimal. If the planner were free to choose T 1 optimally, we would have ∆1 = ∆2 > 0.
If the planner would like to redistribute more towards agent 2, ∆1 − ∆2 > 0 and vice
versa. If the transfer is much too low (high) the derivative will be large in absolute value
and ∆2 (∆1) will be negative. In sum, while the weighted sum of the multipliers on
the present value budget constraints is related to the cost of distortive taxation, their
difference indicates the cost of not being able to redistribute lump sum. These multipliers
thus capture in a simple way the two forces that drive the solution to our model away from
the first best: the absence of lump-sum taxes and of agent-specific lump-sum transfers.
Throughout the paper we will consider variants of this basic model that we will dub
”modified models”. These will be useful to obtain some analytic results and to demon-
strate the behavior of the model.
For the government problem to be well defined we should ensure that the set of feasible
equilibria is non-empty. This is guaranteed, for example, by the existence of a status quo
equilibrium, if τ˜ is larger or equal to the status quo capital tax, and if U2 is close to the
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status quo utility.
3 Characterization of equilibria
Here we describe some analytical results.
3.1 Qualitative behavior of capital taxes
First of all we derive the behavior of the economy in steady state and we describe some
properties of the transition. To the best of our knowledge there is no previous proof of
zero long-run capital taxes that fully applies to our model.14
To obtain this result we assume the government has free disposal of g. More precisely,
we assume that the government can purchase consumption good in excess of g and dump
the excess. It is easy to see that this is equivalent to assuming that the feasibility constraint
(3) holds as an inequality ≤ instead of as equality.
Proposition 1: Assume free disposal of g, log utility of consumption (σc = 1) and
1 >τ˜ > 0. Assume that F (k, 0) = F (0, e) = 0. Assume the economy converges to a steady
state such that c > 0. Then the optimal capital tax rate jumps from the tax limit to zero
in two periods. Formally, there is a finite N such that
τkt = τ˜ for all t ≤ N,
= 0 for all t ≥ N + 2,
Proof:
We proceed in two steps. First we show that it is not possible for the tax limit to be
binding forever in the optimal allocation. Then we show that capital taxes go from the
limit to zero in two periods.
14The results in Chari & Kehoe (1999) and Atkeson et al. (1999) are similar, they also prove the tax limit
cannot be binding forever and that the transition takes two periods. But the results in those papers are not
directly applicable here. They do not consider a tax limit and heterogeneity at the same time but, more
importantly, their proof is for the case of a capital tax limit of 100%. For this particular bound if the tax limit
were binding forever feasibility would be violated. In our case, where τ˜ is the status quo tax the same line of
argument cannot be used: indeed the economy could stay at status quo forever. This is why a more involved
argument is needed.
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First of all, notice that in the log case the first order condition with respect to con-
sumption for t > 0 becomes (see Appendix A)
c−11,t
(
1 + αλ
)− (18)
−c−21,t
(
γt − δγt−1(1 + (Fk(kt−1, et)− d)(1− τ˜))
)
= µt
1 + λ
2
Now we prove that the tax limit cannot be binding in all periods. If indeed the solution
had τkt = τ˜ for all t, then, denoting steady state variables with an upper bar,
δ
[
1 + (Fk(k, e)− d)(1− τ˜)
]
= 1 for all t.
Evaluating (18) at steady state and plugging the last equation into the one above we have
A+ c−21
(
γt − γt−1
)
= µt
1 + λ
2
(19)
where A =c−11 (1 + αλ). The FOC for labor for t > 0 (see appendix A) at steady state
implies
−B(1− l1)−σl
(
1 +
α
λ
φ2
φ1
f ′(λ, l1) + ∆1 +∆2
φ2
φ1
f ′(λ, l1)
)− (20)
σlB(1− l1)−σl−1
(
∆1l1 +∆2
φ2
φ1
f(λ, l1)
)
+
γt−1c−11 (1− τ˜)Fk,e(k, e)
1
2
(φ1 + φ2f ′(λ, l1)) =
−Fe(k, e)12(φ1 + φ2f
′(λ, l1))µt
Notice that we are only imposing steady state on the variables, not on the multipliers.
This is the right way to proceed because real variables have natural bounds and existence
of a steady state may be expected. But the multipliers should not have bounds, otherwise
there is no sense in which the Lagrangian is guaranteed to give a maximum, and a steady
state in the variables could be compatible with multipliers that go to infinity.
Collecting all the terms (20) that do not depend on the multipliers γ or µ we have
B+Cγt−1 = −µt (21)
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for
B=
[
−B(1− l1)−σl
(
1 +
α
λ
φ2
φ1
f ′(λ, l1) + ∆1 +∆2
φ2
φ1
f ′(λ, l1)
)−
σlB(1− l1)−σl−1
(
∆1l1 +∆2
φ2
φ1
f(λ, l1)
)] 1
Fe(k, e)12(φ1 + φ2f
′(λ, l1))
C=
c−11 (1− τ˜)Fke(k, e)
Fe(k, e)
Notice that the terms A,B,C do not depend on the multipliers γ or µ. So, combining
(19) and (21) we have that near the steady state the evolution of γ is approximately given
by
γt = c21
[
A+B
1 + λ
2
]
+
[
1 +Cc21
1 + λ
2
]
γt−1 . (22)
Since the steady state involves c > 0 assumptions F (k, 0) = F (0, e) = 0 imply that
k, e > 0. This implies that 0 < Fe(k, e) < ∞. The constant returns to scale assumption
and concavity implies that Fke(k, e)k = −Fee(k, e)e > 0. All these observations imply
Fke(k, e)
Fe(k, e)
> 0 (23)
Since the assumption τ˜ < 1 and (23) imply C > 0, the last bracket in (22) is larger
than one, and this is an unstable difference equation in γt. This implies that if the tax
limit were binding at the steady state, γt →∞ or −∞ depending on whether A+B1+λ2 is
positive or negative. It is impossible that γt → −∞, as the multiplier γt is non-negative.
Also, γt →∞ implies, through (19), that µt is eventually negative, which is also impossible
under the g-free-disposal assumption. Thus, the tax limit cannot be binding in all periods,
there has to be a period t where τkt < τ˜ .
Now we show that capital taxes go from the limit to zero in two periods. The previous
argument implies that there is a finite N +1 which is the first period where the tax limit
is not binding, so that τkN+1 < τ˜ and τ
k
t = τ˜ for all t ≤ N in the optimum. Given N,
consider the following modification to the baseline model. Assume that instead of the
uniform tax limit in all periods we had considered a model where the tax limits are
τkt ≤ τ˜ for all t 6= N + 1
18
but τkN+1 is unconstrained. Let us call this the ”modified model 1” (MM1). It is clear
that the solution to this problem is equal to the solution of the baseline model, because we
have just relaxed a tax limit that was not binding in the optimum of the baseline model.
Let us keep this fact in store for a while.
Now consider a second modified model, one that we dub MM2, where tax limits are
τkt ≤ τ˜ for all t ≤ N
but τkt is unconstrained for all t > N . Let us denote with a ̂ the solution to MM2.
Clearly the first order conditions for this modified model are the same as for the basic
problem except that
γ̂t = 0 for all t ≥ N (24)
(Notice that γt is the multiplier associated with the constraint on τkt+1, so that τ
k
N+1 being
the first unconstrained tax means γN is the first multiplier that must be 0.)
Combining (24) with (18), implies15
ĉ−11,t
(
1 + α̂λ̂
)
= µ̂t
1 + λ̂
2
for all t ≥ N + 1 (25)
This last equation does not hold for t = N because γ̂N−1 6= 0 appears in (18). Plugging
(24) in the FOC with respect to capital (see appendix A) we get
µ̂t = δµ̂t+1(1 + Fk(kt, et+1)− d) for all t ≥ N
and using (25) we have
ĉ−11,t = δĉ
−1
1,t+1(1 + Fk(kt, et+1)− d) for all t ≥ N + 1
15Notice that in order to obtain the following equation we absolutely need log-utility. This equation would
not hold for higher risk aversions because the term u′′ in the FOC for consumption would not disappear in that
case, so in that case and if capital is not exactly at steady state this does not obtain. Therefore, log utility is
necessary in order obtain the proof. At this writing we are not sure why previous results on the transition of
capital taxes with an upper bound did not incorporate log utility as an assumption.
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Using the Euler equation of the consumer we conclude that
τ̂kt = 0 for all t ≥ N + 2 . (26)
Therefore, the properties for taxes mentioned in the statement of the proposition hold
for the model MM2.
Since the optimal solution for MM2 is also feasible in MM1, even though the latter is
in principle more restrictive because τkt for t > N + 1 are (potentially) constrained, τ̂
k
t is
also the optimal tax in MM1. This proves that in MM1
τkt = 0 for all t ≥ N + 1 .
Since we already argued that the solution to MM1 was equal to the solution of the baseline
model, this completes the proof.16
The tax limit is a forward looking constraint and, therefore, standard dynamic pro-
gramming does not apply. Using a promised utility approach would be complicated be-
cause of the appearance of a state variable (marginal utility of consumption) that has to
be bounded to stay in the set of feasible marginal utilities and since there is a natural state
variable k characterizing this set is quite difficult. The Lagrangian approach of Marcet
& Marimon (1998) is easier to use in these circumstances. The details are worked out in
Appendix C.
3.2 The Frontier of the Equilibrium Set
We now study the frontier of equilibrium utilities. Formally, let F be the frontier of the
set
{
(U1, U2) ∈ R2 : Ui =
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(ci,t) + v(li,t)]
for some {(ci,t, li,t)i=1,2, kt} a CE
}
(27)
16Notice that for the proof to work we do need to consider the two modified models MM1 and MM2. If we
tried to compare MM2 to the solution of the baseline model directly we would not be able to rule out that
τ̂kN+1 > τ˜, the solution to MM2 would then be unfeasible in the baseline model and could not be compared to
it. Considering MM2 as a restricted version of MM1 allows us to rule out τ̂kN+1 > τ˜.
20
In the standard case without distortions and a concave utility function it is well known that
F coincides with the Pareto optimal frontier and it defines a decreasing function of, say, U1
as a function of U2. In this case all these allocations can be traced by optimizing welfare
functions that give different weights to each agent. Given the distortions introduced by
proportional taxes we cannot be sure that the set (27) is convex. Once we leave the
beautiful world of maximizing concave objective functions over convex sets we are no
longer sure if considering a welfare function allows us to trace the frontier of equilibria.
Furthermore now the frontier of equilibria may not coincide with the set of Pareto optimal
allocations. There are indeed models where the frontier of equilibria has a convex part
that cannot be found by maximizing welfare functions.
But the situation is not totally desperate. We can still find sufficient conditions guar-
anteeing that by maximizing a welfare function in the standard way we obtain points in
the frontier, and we can be confident that some of these points are Pareto optimal while
others are not. Furthermore we can give sufficient conditions for finding all Pareto optimal
allocations.
For the result below we need to consider yet another minor modification of the baseline
model and we replace the minimum utility constraint (12) by an equality constraint
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(c2,t) + v(l2,t)] = U2 (28)
where U2 is restricted so that the set of feasible competitive equilibria satisfying this
constraint is non-empty. Let us call this the ”modified model number 3”, or MM3.
Finally, let us consider yet another modified model, MM4 which consists of solving,
for a given α ∈ [−∞,∞]
max
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
u(c1,t) + v(l1,t) + α [u(λc1,t) + v(f(λ, l1,t)) ]
]
(29)
subject to all competitive equilibrium constraints and the tax limit. Notice that we allow
for negative α’s and that we consider the case α = ±∞ as a convention to denote the case
where agent 1 or 2 receive no weight.
We show that MM4 can be used to trace a large part of the frontier F and the Pareto
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optimal allocations within it.
Given α ∈ [−∞,∞], let Ui(α) be the utility of consumer i = 1, 2 in the solution to
MM4. Assume
A1 A solution to MM4 exists for all α ∈ [−∞,∞]. Also, Ui(α) is well defined for i = 1, 2.
That a solution exists is satisfied by standard requirements such as that the set of
equilibria is non-empty and that the utility functions are bounded. That Ui(α) is well
defined amounts to assuming that each α gives a unique utility level for each agent or,
equivalently, that F does not have a linear part.
Proposition 2: Assume A1 .
1. given α ∈ [−∞,∞] the solution of MM4 also solves MM3 for U2 = U2(α).
2. given α ∈ [−∞,∞] the solution of MM4 defines a point on the frontier:
(U1(α), U2(α)) ∈ F
3. if α ≥ 0 the solution to MM4 is pareto-optimal
4. Assume, in addition,
A2 U2(·) is monotonic decreasing and invertible for α ∈ [0,∞].
then every Pareto optimal allocation is also the solution of MM4 for some α ≥ 0
Proof
Fix α ∈ [−∞,∞]. To show part 1, let UMM31 (U2) be the value of the maximum of
MM3. By definition, U1(α) + αU2(α) is the value of the maximum of MM4. Since the
solution to MM3 is feasible in MM4 we have
U1(α) + αU2(α) ≥ UMM31 (U2(α)) + αU2(α)
so that U1(α) ≥ UMM31 (U2(α)). Also, the solution to MM4 is feasible in MM3 for U2 =
U2(α), therefore U1(α) ≤ UMM31 (U2(α)). This shows that U1(α) = UMM31 (U2(α)) or,
equivalently, that the maxima of MM4 and MM3 coincide when U2 = U2(α)
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Now we prove part 2. For any α ∈ [−∞,∞] we just need to find pairs of utilities
that do not belong to the set (27) which are arbitrarily close to (U1(α), U2(α)). Consider
any ε > 0. For α ≥ 0 the pair of utilities (U1(α) + ε, U2(α) + ε) is outside the set (27),
otherwise it would have been chosen over the optimum in MM4 since it achieves a higher
value of the objective. Points such as (U1(α) + ε, U2(α) + ε) can be made arbitrarily
close to (U1(α), U2(α)) by considering arbitrarily small ε. Therefore (U1(α), U2(α)) is
on the frontier for α ≥ 0. For α ≤ 0 a similar argument shows that points such as
(U1(α) + ε, U2(α) − ε) are outside the feasible set and can be made arbitrarily close to
(U1(α), U2(α)).
Part 3: if there is a feasible combination of utilities (U˜1, U˜2) that Pareto dominates
(U1(α), U2(α)) the optimum of MM4 would not be attained at (U1(α), U2(α)).
For part 4, note that if (Û1, Û2) is a Pareto optimal allocation assumption A2 guaran-
tees that there is an α̂ such that Û2 = U2(α̂). This and the fact that (Û1, Û2) is Pareto
optimal means that Û1 ≥ U1(α̂) so that Û1 + α̂Û2 ≥ U1(α̂) + α̂U2(α̂). But the fact that
the solution to MM4 is attained at (U1(α̂), U2(α̂)) means that the reverse inequality also
holds. This means that Û1 + α̂Û2 ≥ U1(α̂) + α̂U2(α̂) and that the maximum of MM4 for
α̂ is attained at (Û1, Û2).

Therefore by varying α from plus to minus infinity and maximizing (29) we can trace
out points on the frontier of equilibria F and all points (U1(α)), U2(α)) for positive α
are Pareto optimal. Furthermore, under A2 we are sure that we will find all Pareto
optimal allocations in this fashion. The points in F corresponding to negative α solve
MM3 for U2 = U2(α) but these equilibria are not Pareto optimal since, as indicated by
the negative Lagrange multiplier α, the first agent’s utility could be increased in MM3 by
also increasing U2.
More points on the frontier can be found if the consumers trade places in the objective
function (29), that is, if α multiplies the utility of agent 1. Then, by varying α (now
the weight of agent 1) from zero to negative infinity again we could find points on the
equilibrium frontier that are again not Pareto optimal and that are obtained by forcing
the planner to give a certain utility to agent one.
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There is one caveat: assumptions A1 and A2 need to be checked. Since the feasible set
is non-convex the only way to check A1 is to check that there is only one solution to MM4.
This can be done numerically by searching for more solutions to the first order conditions
as in scores of papers where the maximum is found by searching for all critical points
and, if more than one is found, the values of the objective function are compared. We can
explore numerically if A2 holds by recorded all utilities for a fine grid of α’s and checking
that U2(α) is increasing. In this way we can be confident that we found all Pareto optimal
competitive equilibria and that we traced out a ”large part” of the frontier F . We did
this check for all the examples shown below, the case depicte in Figure 1 is discussed in
detail below.
The Pareto optimal-Pareto improving (POPI) plans can be found as those points of
F that have a non-negative α and with utilities that are larger than status quo. Note
that non-optimal points on F , i.e. points where α < 0, may also be Pareto-improving
relative to the status quo. In this case, F has an increasing part, any POPI plan will
strictly improve the utility of one of the agents and it is not possible to shift all the gains
to the other agent in a Pareto optimal way. All these concepts will be illustrated in the
model we consider in section 4.2, in which the frontier features such a part that Pareto
dominates the status quo.
4 Numerical Results
We now present and discuss our numerical results. Details on our computational strategy
can be found in appendix B. In the next subsection we discuss how we calibrate the model.
We then analyze the case in which labor supply is fixed. With a fixed labor supply the
Ramsey equilibrium with a representative agent would set all capital taxes equal to zero,
and only labor would be taxed, to achieve the first best without any tax distortion. The
tax limits would not be binding in the optimum. As we will see, even with a fixed labor
supply, with heterogeneous agents the POPI policy is likely to involve a long transition
with high capital taxes. This is because the planner will need to redistribute wealth in
favor of the worker in order to ensure that his utility increases relative to the status quo.
The planner is willing to lose efficiency and have high capital taxes for many periods in
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order to achieve a Pareto improving allocation. Since for the homogeneous case there
are no distortions whatsoever the fixed labor supply model demonstrates clearly that the
need to redistribute in a heterogeneous agent Pareto improving allocation is what drives
early capital taxes up. Then we go on to study the optimal policy in the case with a
somewhat flexible labor supply. This case is not only studied for generality but because
it reveals additional features of optimal plans. In this case, as is well known, even in the
homogeneous agent model the planner would like to have high early capital taxes. This
compounds with the redistributive effect and it turns out that the planner set high early
capital taxes and low labor taxes, for many years after the reform starts. This will induce
high labor supply in the early periods, it will achieve faster capital accumulation in the
initial periods because the return to capital increases even though capital taxes are still
high. We contrast these results with those from an extension of our model in which lump
sum transfers are permitted as a way of gaining intuition for the forces at work.
4.1 Calibration
Preference parameters
σc 1
σl 3
B .76
δ .96
Heterogeneity Parameters
φc/φw 1.05
kc,−1 5.49
kw,−1 -3.47
Production parameters
αk .36
d .08
k−1 1.01
Government spending g .13
Tax rates before reform
τ l .23
τ k .57
Upper bound on cap. tax
rate
τ˜ .57
Table 1: Parameter Values of the Baseline Economy.
All parameters except for the tax rates remain the same during the policy experiments.
We calibrate the model at a yearly frequency. An overview of our parameter choices is
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provided in table 4.1. Here is a justification of these choices
Preferences: The utility function is as stated in section 2. We choose σc = 1 in
keeping with a large part of the literature on capital taxes and in order to use proposition
1. The choice of σl = 3 is for the case of an elastic supply of labor, it avoids labor
supply from greatly differing across groups with different wealth, notice that this implies
a much lower elasticity of labor supply than many applications of real business cycles.17
The discount factor δ and B are standard, the latter chosen such that in a corresponding
representative agent economy agents would work one third of their time in the steady
state before the reform.
Heterogeneity: Our two types of agents are heterogeneous with respect to both their
labor efficiency φj and their initial wealth kj,−1. For simplicity we will from now on speak
of ”workers”, indexed w, and ”capitalists”, indexed c. Capitalists are the group whose
ratio of wealth to labor efficiency is higher, i.e. they are rich relative to their earnings
potential, but both agents work and save. Note, however, that in absolute terms the
capitalists are both richer AND more productive. In the status quo before the reform the
heterogeneity parameters of table 4.1 translate into a relative consumption of the workers
of λ = 0.4.
We base our choice of relative labor efficiency and wealth on the analysis of the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics performed in Garcia-Mila` et al. (1995). They argue that
the relevant measure of inequality is the wage/wealth ratio φj/kj,−1 and they split their
sample in five groups each containing a quintile of the distribution of this ratio across the
population. We confine ourselves to only two agents in order to facilitate computations and
to better understand the workings of the model, but the policies we find would presumably
Pareto improve all agents in the middle categories. The degree of heterogeneity in our
calibration approximately corresponds to the two most extreme groups in Garcia-Mila`
et al. (1995). We think of our two agents as representing the two groups, each with a
20% weight in the population, that would have the most opposing views about how to
change labor and capital taxes. It seems reasonable to focus on groups of this size, since
a tax reform will be difficult to approve and sustain if it hurts 20% of the population. We
17See Garcia-Mila` et al. (1995) for a discussion of the tradeoffs in choosing σl to match cross-section or
time-series evidence.
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understate heterogeneity relative to a case where the government would only carry out
reforms that improved absolutely all agents, since in the actual population there are some
agents in these quintiles with even more different wage/wealth ratios than in our model.
Production: We use a standard yearly calibration for technology. The production
function is Cobb-Douglas with a capital income share of αk = .36. There is no productivity
growth. The depreciation rate is d = .08. Initial aggregate capital is such that the
corresponding representative agent economy would be in steady state before the reform.
Government: Before the reform the capital and labor income tax rates are 57% and
23% respectively. These are the average marginal tax rates calculated by McGrattan,
Rogerson & Wright (1997) for the period 1947-87. Government spending per period, g,
is chosen to balance the budget intertemporally with these tax rates in the status quo.
It amounts to about 25% of output. Note that the choice of tax rates in the status quo
matters for two reasons. First of all, the capital tax rate influences the status quo steady
state (and hence initial) capital stock. Secondly, status quo utilities depend on the tax
rates, and thus restrict the scope for Pareto improvements.
We assume that during the reform the capital tax rate can never increase above its
initial level so we set τ˜ equal to status quo capital taxes.
4.2 Pareto Optimal-Pareto Improving Plans: Fixed labor
supply
The set of POPI plans deviates from the first best for two reasons. One is the standard
reason in models of factor taxation: the need to raise tax revenue discourages the supply
of capital and/or labor. The second reason is the lack of non-distortive means of redis-
tribution between the agent types. Since our paper is mostly about the latter, we first
analyze a case in which only the redistributive effect is present. We consider a case with
a fixed labor supply, where taxes can be chosen so as to not discourage factor supply and,
in the homogeneous agent case, the first best without any distortion is achieved. In the
next subsection we consider an elastic labor supply.
We assume a fixed labor supply equal to one third. This amounts to taking σl → ∞
with the scaling parameter B appropriately adjusted so that labor supply stays at one
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third. Except for σl, B, all other parameters are as in table 4.1.
In a model of homogeneous agents capital taxes would be abolished immediately and
all revenues would be collected free of distortions from taxes on labor. In a model of
heterogenous agents, if the government could stipulate agent-specific lump sum transfers
between agents at time zero (Tw = −T c, as introduced at the end of section 2) this would
resolve the problem of how to redistribute wealth. Then the first best policy could be
achieved for any distribution of welfare gains. But in the case of interest where lump sum
redistribution is not possible, deviations from the first best policy with zero capital taxes
at all times are necessary for distributive reasons.
In figure 1 we compare the set of POPI plans to the first best in terms of welfare
gains.18 First of all note that assumption A2 is satisfied and that by lowering α the utility
of agent 2 goes down, therefore Proposition 2 can be used to trace the whole Pareto optimal
points and additional points on the frontier. The line labeled ”first best” represents those
allocations described in the previous paragraph where agent-specific lump sum transfers
are available. Clearly, the absence of transfers significantly reduces the scope for Pareto
improvements. All POPI plans depicted in the solid line are inferior to the first best.
Why? It turns out that the first best plans that are Pareto improvements upon the status
quo would all involve positive transfers to the worker, Tw > 0. Absent these transfers, the
immediate abolition of capital taxes would severely hurt the worker as has been shown
previously in a number of contributions.19 This is because capital taxes in the status quo
are disproportionately borne by the capitalist, and when they are abolished labor taxes
have to rise in order for the government to meet its budget constraint. This increase in
labor taxes due to of an immediate reform has a strong redistributive effect and - from
the perspective of the worker - it would overcompensate the welfare gains arising from
increased efficiency. The only thing the planner can do to make the abolition of capital
taxes palatable for the worker is to keep capital taxes as high as possible for a long time
(the N periods of proposition 1) before setting capital taxes to zero. It turns out that
18In all the figures reporting results on welfare, the welfare gains for each agent are measured as the percentage,
permanent increase in status quo consumption that would give the agent the same utility as in the optimal tax
reform. Therefore, the origin of the graph represents the status quo utility, and the positive orthant contains
Pareto improving allocations.
19See Correia (1995), Garcia-Mila` et al. (1995), Domeij & Heathcote (2004) and Conesa & Krueger (2006).
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capital taxes have to be at the upper bound for 10 years (in the POPI plan where the
worker gains nothing) to 22 years (in the α = 0 POPI plan). Some revenue is then still
raised from capital taxes so that labor taxes need not raise all revenue. But this implies
a cost in efficiency, because the economy remains distorted for a long time, while it would
be non-distorted if lump-sum redistribution were feasible. This is why POPI plans are
second best even though taxation would be entirely non-distortive in a homogeneous agent
model or if lump sum redistribution were available.20
The absence of a lump-sum redistributive instrument not only drives the set of POPI
plans away from the first best. It moreover limits the degree to which welfare gains can be
shifted towards the worker. This can be seen from the dotted continuation of the POPI
line in figure 1. This dotted line is part of the frontier of feasible equilibria F , like the
POPI line, however, the allocations along this part of the frontier are not Pareto optimal,
and they are found for negative α, corresponding to imposing the constraint with equality
(28) as in model MM3 described in section 3.2. The junction of the solid and dotted
lines corresponds to the point where α = 0. It would be possible to improve both agents
by moving from the dotted line to the plan corresponding to α = 0, I.e. by forcing the
capitalist onto a certain (low) utility level the planner also harms the worker.
It is worthwhile noting that even though the utility loss relative to the first best is small
if we only focus on equilibria that leave the worker indifferent and give all the benefits
of the reform to the capitalist (i.e., if we focus on points where the frontiers cross the
vertical axis of figure 1) the utility loss is very large if we try to give some of the benefits
to the worker. The most we can give to the worker is a 2% improvement, which is about
one-eighth of the most the worker could gain with lump sum redistribution. There is little
to be gained from cutting capital taxes if the worker must enjoy most of the benefits.
Finally, we report the optimal policy under the veil of ignorance, when α = 1. This
policy gives utilities (Πk,Πl) = (4.41,1.53) and, as figure 1 shows it is quite close to the
point where α = 0 and the capitalist receives zero weight.
20Notice that in the case of a fixed labor supply the evolution of labor taxes is undetermined, all that matters
is that the net present value of labor taxes balances the government budget constraint given the optimal path
for capital taxes found.
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4.3 Main model
4.3.1 Welfare frontier and capital tax
We now return to our main model for the rest of the analysis, featuring a somewhat elastic
labor supply. The value σl = 3 in table 4.1 amounts to a labor elasticity of about 1/3, still
a low value compared to many empirical estimates of about .5 for a representative agent.
Figure 2 reports the set of POPI plans in terms of welfare gains. Again, we contrast our
main model with the case with optimal agent-specific transfers Tw = −T c. Note, though,
that the case with transfers is no longer first best because positive capital and/or labor
taxes are needed to raise some tax revenue and pay for the government spending.
Again, the absence of redistributive transfers clearly constitutes an extra constraint
on the feasible set and the welfare gains are smaller for Ramsey POPI allocations. But
the limits to redistribution are less severe here than with exogenous labor supply. The
equilibrium frontier F (the solid line) is now decreasing in the range of Pareto superior
allocations, so that it is now feasible to leave either the worker or the capitalist indifferent
relative to status quo without violating Pareto optimality. Not only that, the total loss
of welfare relative to the case with transfers is now much lower. If we focus, for example,
on points that give equal gain to both agents (the points where each frontier crosses the
450 line) we see it is roughly 4% for both agents in the POPI line, only slightly below the
4.25% to be gained by both agents with lump sum redistribution. We conjecture, though,
that for sufficiently high σl and correspondingly inelastic labor supply the picture would
start resembling that of figure 1.
As the distribution of welfare gains varies along the frontier of POPI plans, so do the
corresponding capital tax schedule and relative consumption of agents. Qualitatively the
properties of capital taxes over time are always the same: As we know from Proposition 1
capital taxes stay at their upper bound for all but the last period of the transition and then
they transit to zero with at most one intermittent period. A typical time path for capital
taxes is drawn in figure 3. But the length of the transition increases as welfare gains
are shifted towards the worker. This is illustrated in the first panel of figure 4 showing
the duration of the transition in the vertical axis for each POPI allocation indexed by the
welfare gain of the worker on the horizontal axis. We see that the number of periods before
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capital taxes drop to zero increases from about ten to twenty years as we increase the
welfare gain of the worker from zero (i.e., leaving the worker indifferent with status quo)
to 9%, which leaves the capitalist indifferent with status quo. Along with the duration of
the transition the present value share of capital taxes in government revenues increases
from 15% to 24%, as the second panel in figure 4 reveals.21 This is the clue to why a
longer period of high capital taxes is beneficial for the worker: The worker contributes to
the public coffers primarily through labor taxes, which means his burden in the long run
stands to increase through the reform, while the capitalist’s long run burden decreases.
The earlier capital taxes are suppressed, the more revenue has to be raised from labor
taxes and the bigger the relative tax burden of the worker.
The final panel in figure 4 depicts α, the multiplier on the minimum utility constraint
for the worker, and λ, the ratio of the worker’s consumption to the capitalist’s in equi-
librium. We put these two graphs in the same picture because in the standard case in
dynamic models, under log utility, without distorting taxes and with complete markets,
we would have α = λ. More precisely, this equality holds in a first best situation, without
distorting taxation and no distributive conflict (∆1 = ∆2 = 0), if the upper bound on
capital taxes never binds (γt = 0 ∀t). In our second best world, by contrast, as we increase
the welfare of the worker the marginal cost of doing so (as measured by α) explodes, while
his consumption share increases only mildly. In fact, it always remains very close to its
value in the status quo, which is 0.4. This shows that it is very difficult to alter the ratio
of consumption (λ) even if the planner cares very differently about the agents given that it
has access only to proportional taxes and agent-specific lump sum taxes are not available.
If optimal lump sum transfers were possible, the graphs in figure 4 would look very
different. We have computed that for all Pareto optimal allocations capital taxes would
be suppressed after 5-6 years, and the share of capital taxes would always be 0.11. The
multiplier on the worker’s utility constraint α would increase very little with Π(worker),
while λ would rise much more than without the transfer. This is because in this case
the redistribution can be achieved with agent-specific lump sum taxes independently of
the fact that the planner lowers quickly capital taxes to achieve aggregate efficiency. The
21For comparison, the share of capital taxes in revenues is about .43 in the status quo.
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policies and the path of the economy would hardly depend on the distribution of the gains
from reform. That shifting welfare gains and consumption between agents would be much
easier, as indicated by the behavior of α and λ.22
Focusing on Pareto improving allocations means that the unit of interest is the utility
that each agent achieves through various tax reforms. Under this view, the weight α is just
a Lagrange multiplier determined in equilibrium, and it measures the cost of enforcing the
minimum utility constraint. The fact that α has to increase so much to achieve a small
redistribution is just a reflection of the difficulties that the planner finds in redistributing
wealth from one agent to the other when only capital or labor taxes are available.
Another way of looking at α is as the relative weight that the worker receives in the
welfare function of the government. This suggests to interpret α as a measure of the bias of
the social planner in favor of the workers. In particular, if one were to focus on the optimal
allocation under the ”veil of ignorance”, since both types of agents are equally abundant
in the economy, the relevant policy would be the one corresponding to α = 1. This also
corresponds to a model of probabilistic voting where both agents are equally influential.
Many recent papers with on dynamic optimal policy with heterogeneous agents use this
welfare function. As can be seen from the bottom panel in Figure 4 the optimal policy
for α = 1 corresponds to a welfare gain by the worker of about 8%. This point has also
been depicted in the frontier of equilibria in figure 1. By chance, the optimal policy under
the veil of ignorance happens to be Pareto improving. It gives most of the benefit of the
reform to the worker. For this welfare function capital taxes are zero after 18 years.
In appendix D we show that the main features described here are robust to changes
in the parameter values when some of the parameters are changed in one direction at a
time from the benchmark case.
4.3.2 The time path of the economy
The evolution of capital, labor supply, the labor tax rate, and the government deficit are
pictured in figure 5. First, note that qualitatively the paths are very similar across the
set of POPI plans. The horizontal shifts in the graphs occur because the more a plan
22Note that even with redistributive lump sum taxes we do not obtain α = λ. This only holds in optimal
allocations when there is no distortionary taxation.
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benefits the worker the longer capital taxes remain at their initial level. The kinks in the
paths of labor taxes and government deficit occur precisely in the intermediate period
when capital taxes transit from their maximum to zero.
The most surprising observation is, perhaps, that labor taxes should be initially low-
ered, and they should remain low for a long time. The reason for this behavior is the
following: the planner wants to frontload capital taxes for the usual reason described at
length in the literature that early capital taxes imply taxing capital that is already in
place.23 Therefore, it is optimal to keep capital taxes at the upper limit in the first few
periods and then let them go to zero. With such high capital taxes investors would not
invest much. But the government has another instrument that can be used to boost out-
put and capital accumulation in the early periods. The government can lower labor taxes,
inducing an increase in the labor supply, causing the return of capital to go up, increasing
investment in the initial periods, and achieving a faster convergence to the optimal long
run capital/labor ratio compatible with zero capital taxes. The upper right panel in figure
5 shows that aggregate labor supply is very high in the early periods.24 Note that the ac-
cumulation of capital accelerates around the period that capital taxes become zero, as can
be seen by comparing the kink in the graph for labor taxes with the capital accumulation
graph. Therefore, eventually the zero capital tax is the one promoting growth and helping
the economy converge to the new steady state. Absent this backloading of labor taxes
capital would initially grow only to the extent that the expectation of low capital taxes
in the distant future raises incentives to save early on. In this case capital accumulation
would be much slower, as in the fixed labor supply case of section 4.2. Therefore, the low
early labor taxes are an instrument to induce investment in the early periods that can be
used in the case of an elastic labor supply.
A similar result of low early labor taxes has been found in models of homogeneous
agents.25 The same pattern can be observed in our model if optimal transfers are allowed,
we have computed that in the case of agent-specific lump sum transfers Tw = −T c the
23For example, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) describe in detail this issue in several models with homoge-
neous agents.
24Capitalists, who also have higher labor productivity, always work less than workers.
25For example, section III of Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) shows a model where labor taxes should be
very negative and capital taxes should be very high in the first period only.
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period of low labor taxes would be much shorter, of about 5-6 years, matching the lower
duration of the transition to zero capital taxes. But implementing this policy without
the lump sum transfers would leave the workers worse off relative to status quo. Redis-
tributive concerns lengthen the transition three or four times, as described in the previous
paragraph.
It is interesting that the redistributive effect and the effect of promoting growth go
in the same direction: they both induce the planner to set low initial labor taxes. This
explains why with flexible labor supply the POPI frontier is closer to the frontier with
optimal transfers, as shown in Figure 2, than it was in the fixed labor supply case. With
an elastic labor supply the desire to boost investment early on is not in conflict with the
redistribution objective.
A somewhat surprising pattern that emerges from the pictures is that the long run
labor tax rate is higher for the policy that favors the worker. This may seem paradoxical
because the worker is interested in low labor taxes. Note though, that even though the
long run labor tax rate is higher if the worker is favored, the initial cut is even stronger
for these policies, so that the share of labor taxes in the total present value of revenues is
lower for policies that favor more the worker, as figure 4 showed. This suggests that the
long run labor tax rate is high for two reasons. First, when capital taxation is abandoned
late the initial boost to capital accumulation comes mainly from extremely low initial
labor taxes. I.e. the backloading of labor taxes is strongest in these cases. Second, the
long run labor supply is lower the later capital taxes are suppressed, while the gross wage
is always the same.26
Since government expenditures are constant, the low initial labor taxes translate into
government deficits. Only as labor taxes rise and output grows the government budget
turns into surplus. Once capital taxes are suppressed and revenues fall again, the govern-
ment deficit quickly reaches its long run value which can be positive or negative depending
on whether during the transition the government accumulated wealth or not. We can see
from figure 5 that most POPI policies imply that the government runs a primary surplus
26Since the long run real return on capital is determined by the rates of time preference and depreciation
and the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the long run capital-labor ratio and wage are independent of the
policy - as long as capital taxes are zero eventually.
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in the long run. This implies that the government is in debt in the long run, because
the primary surplus is needed to pay the interest on debt. Therefore, for most POPI tax
reforms low taxes in the initial periods generate a positive level of long run government
debt.
This feature of the model is quite different from that of Chamley, where the government
accumulated savings in the early periods to lower the labor tax bill in the long run. Here,
the early drop in labor taxes is financed in part with long run government debt, showing
that one possible reason for government debt is to finance the initial stages of a reform.
4.4 Related issues
Our main intention has been to comment on the Chamley/Judd result. Therefore, we
have stayed as close as possible to their model. Now we explore several variations of the
model to consider issues of progressive taxation, political sustainability of equilibrium,
and time consistency.
4.4.1 Progressive taxes
Given that we set out to analyze the consequences of distributive concerns for optimal
tax policy, it might strike the reader as very restrictive to allow proportional factor tax-
ation only. After all, one of the prime instruments of redistribution in the real world is
progressive taxation so it is natural to ask if allowing for a progressive tax code would
solve the redistributive concerns and cause the economy to be closer to the first best. We
therefore now consider an extension of our model that allows for non-proportional taxes
in a simple way.
We assume that the planner can choose a uniform lump-sum payment D that is paid
in period zero uniformly across all agents. Following Werning (2007), under complete
markets this is equivalent to a fixed deductible from the tax base in each period. A
positive D means progressive taxation. Introducing this in the model implies that we
need to add u′(c1,0)
[
∆1+∆2
]D to the W-term in equation (16). We then let the planner
maximize over D additionally.
We find that if we restrict our attention to non-negative D (progressive taxation), the
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optimal choice is to set D =0. Therefore, the government will choose not to use this
progressive instrument.
The reason for this result is the following: there are two forces at work in the deter-
mination of the optimal D. On the one hand, redistributive concerns would advise the
government to choose a positive D, since capitalists are richer. But a negative D is equiv-
alent to a lump-sum tax, and it allows to raise revenue in a distortion-free manner. In the
standard case of a representative agent model, where only this second force is present, the
first best can be achieved by choose a negative D big enough (in absolute value) to raise
all government revenue ever needed. In our model with heterogeneous agents it turns out
that the second force is stronger.
We find that, if it could, the government would set a negative D. How can this be
Pareto improving? The reason is that the government now redistributes by choosing very
negative labor taxes for many periods. In fact, the present value of revenues from labor
taxes is not only negative but even bigger in absolute value than the revenue from capital
taxes. The transition is faster than in the main model, between 4 and 14 periods in both
extremes of the POPI frontier. Welfare gains are larger than in the case with optimal
transfers.
This optimal tax scheme (negative D and negative labor taxes) is Pareto improving
only because we did not consider agents of different wealth within each type of agent in
our calibration. In the real world some agents have a high wage/wealth ratio who are
rich (say, some young stockbrokers) and agents with a low wage/wealth ratio who are
poor (say, some farmers in economically depressed areas). We calibrated according to
wage/wealth ratios because following Garcia-Mila` et al. (2000) this is appropriate when
only proportional taxes are allowed, but once progressive taxation is considered the total
income of the agent is also relevant. Therefore, a careful study of progressive taxation
should introduce total income in the calibration, in that case the optimal scheme described
above would be unlikely Pareto improving. This is left for future research. But the results
in this subsection show that progressive taxation will have many difficulties in solving the
redistribution problem.
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4.4.2 The evolution of wealth and welfare and time consistency
One might conjecture that the welfare of workers and capitalists drifts apart in the long
run, with capitalists profiting from the abolition of capital taxes and workers suffering
from high labor taxes in the long run. It might seem that such a scenario would render
the tax reform politically unsustainable. We now study this issue, first informally by
exploring the evolution of welfare and wealth and then more formally by addressing issues
of time consistency.
The time paths of agents’ wealth and welfare are plotted in figure 6. Welfare increases
along with the accumulation of capital, and - contrary to the conjecture - both agents’
welfare evolves more or less in lock step. The reason is that, by the competitive equilib-
rium conditions (7) both their relative consumption and their relative leisure are roughly
constant over time. Therefore it is not the case that workers will lose dramatically when
capital taxes finally drop to zero.
This is an implication of the permanent income hypothesis. Agents’ income net of
taxes varies through time, so agents will save or dissave in order to smooth consumption
and hours. The smooth time path of welfare is made possible by a less smooth path of
individual wealth. Since the worker’s main contribution to public coffers is due in later
periods when labor taxes are high and in the early years of the new policy he benefits from
extremely low labor taxes, he accumulates wealth to provide for the higher tax burden he
will face later on. The capitalist’s tax burden, by contrast, tends to decrease over time
since initial capital taxes are very high and they are later suppressed. By deferring wealth
accumulation until his tax burden drops, he can afford a smoother consumption profile.
The fact that welfare of both agent types increases over time in a similar fashion
suggests that the solution is, in some sense, politically sustainable. We can study if the
solution we found is time consistent more formally.27 An issue to be addressed in this
case is what is the objective function of the planner at the time of reoptimization at some
future date. One alternative is to assume that the planner uses the same welfare function
implied by the initial Lagrange multiplier on (15) α. Another alternative is to assume
that the weight α switches through time and it is set according to a bargaining scheme
27The literature on time consistency in models with heterogenous agents is not very large. One exception is
Armenter (2004).
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or political competition. Another option is to assume that consensus is required so that
a Pareto improvement is needed for reoptimization to take place.
We perform some numerical checks that give a partial answer to the question of time
consistency. We assume that the optimal plan is followed forM periods and then the plan-
ner reoptimizes taking kg,M−1, kw,M−1, kc,M−1, and τkM as given. We then check whether
the reoptimized solution differs from the remaining path under the original solution for
various fixed weights and when consensus is required.28
Let us first consider constant welfare weights. This approach could be motivated
with reference to a political economy set-up with one-off probabilistic voting where the
political power of each agent is constant through time. Reoptimization then means that
voters unexpectedly get the chance to vote again about the best capital/labor tax policy
in period M .29 Under probabilistic voting a weighted sum of utilities is maximized, with
the weights determined by population weights and the degree to which a voter group
votes on grounds of policy rather than ideology.30 For example, when both of our equal
sized groups are equally easy to sway, they each receive the same welfare weight (α = 1),
and the situation is the same as under the ”veil of ignorance”. Under this approach, our
optimal plans are not time consistent. In all our calculations reoptimization with constant
welfare weights leads to an extension of the period during which capital taxes remain high.
This raises the utility of the worker relative to his continuation utility under the original
policy and reduces that of the capitalist. For example, for the case α = 1, if we reoptimize
in period M = 5, the total duration of the transition (counting from t = 0) increases from
18 to 23 years. Relative to the continuation utility under the original optimal plan the
worker experiences a welfare gain of 3%, while the capitalist loses 2.2%. Therefore, in this
sense, the worker would prefer to delay yet again the elimination of capital taxes.
We also consider the case where the reoptimization takes place only if a Pareto im-
proving allocation can be found at time M relative to the agents’ continuation utilities at
the period of reoptimization. This would correspond to a situation where the tax reform
28Here, unlike in period zero, government may have issued bonds during the first M periods so kg,M−1 may
be non-zero.
29If agents expected to vote repeatedly, we would have to consider a dynamic voting model. This would
complicate the model and it would mean going further away from the original setup of Chamley.
30For a brief introduction to probabilistic voting see Persson & Tabellini (2000), ch. 3.
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announced in period 0 can be changed only if there is consensus across all agents to do
so.
From our numerical experiments it seems impossible to make one agent strictly bet-
ter off without hurting the other, so that reoptimizing with consensus always leads to
the confirmation of the original plan in terms of taxes and allocations. Only the time-
invariant multipliers α and ∆i change. Notice that this is compatible with the results
of constant weights discussed in the previous paragraph, since in the reoptimized pol-
icy with constant weights involves a utility loss of the capitalist and it is, therefore, not
Pareto improving in period M . The time-variant multipliers µt and γt are rescaled by
a factor 1+α˜1+α , where the tilde indicates the reoptimized solution. Moreover, we have the
relationship γM−1 = 1+α1+α˜
(
∆˜1k1,M−1+∆˜2k2,M−1
)
. Inspection of the first order conditions
shows that the remainder of the original optimal plan satisfies the first order conditions
of the reoptimization problem if these relationships between the multipliers hold and α˜
and the ∆i are appropriately chosen. Interestingly, α˜ always turns out smaller than α.
For instance, in the above mentioned case of α = 1 and reoptimization in M = 5 the con-
tinuation utilities are respected if α = 0.603. Thus, effectively the influence of the worker
on the solution under consensus reform has to be lower at the point of reoptimization for
the original solution to be time consistent.
This suggests that in order to sustain the tax reform it is not necessary to write the
reform as part of a constitution that cannot be changed forever at any cost. It is enough
to require that the constitution can only be changed under wide consensus for the tax
reform to be sustainable.31
5 Conclusion
We find that there is, most definitely, an equity/efficiency trade-off in the determination
of capital and labor taxes. Capital taxes should be zero in the long run, but this is an
optimal Pareto improving policy only if capital taxes are very high, and labor taxes very
low, for a very long time after the reform starts. The government typically accumulates
debt in the long run in order to finance the initial cut in labor taxes. Lower initial labor
31This result is reminiscent of the one found by Armenter (2004) in a different model.
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taxes are necessary for two reasons: first, to redistribute wealth in favor of the worker so
as to ensure that he/she also gains from the reform and, second, to boost investment in
the initial periods. These features of the optimal policy remain in the special case when
the planner has a welfare function that weighs all agents equally as in the optimal policy
under the veil of ignorance.
Many of our results are numerical, for a given calibration of heterogeneity according
to wage/wealth ratios. The results are robust to many variations in parameter values and
even to the introduction of progressive taxation. If labor supply is inelastic it is very costly
to make the worker enjoy significant benefits from the capital tax cut. The solution seems
to be time consistent if consensus is required at the time of reoptimization, suggesting
that the tax reform is credible if it can only be overturned when all agents agree. On the
other hand, the solution is time inconsistent if reoptimization takes place with a welfare
function that has constant weights.
While the Chamley/Judd result may have discouraged some economists from studying
optimal capital and labor taxes with heterogeneous agents, we find that issues of redistri-
bution are crucial in designing optimal policies involving capital/labor taxes. Therefore,
research on these issues should be encouraged, both from an empirical and theoretical
point of view.
One avenue for research is to study other policy instruments that may be used to
compensate the workers for the elimination of capital taxes. For example, certain types of
government spending or other tax cuts could have this role. More empirical work on the
relevant aspects of heterogeneity so that issues of progressivity can be addressed carefully
is certainly needed. The transition in our model is very long. Less-than-full credibility and
less-than-fully rational expectations might render this policy not very effective in practice.
Introducing issues of partial credibility, time consistency, learning about expectations and
political economy would therefore be of interest and might influence the picture on what
an optimal policy should do.
A general methodological lesson is that one needs to go beyond long run analysis in
order to make any policy recommendations. A researcher looking only at the long run in
our model would give the wrong recommendation that capital taxes should be suppressed
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to achieve a Pareto improvement, while this is not at all what should be done for many
periods. In particular, the nowadays fashionable ’timeless perspective’, which is only
interpretable as the behavior of optimal policy in the steady state, would give exactly
this wrong recommendation. The steady state analysis usually found in the literature is,
therefore, only the beginning of a normative analysis, but studying the transition is not
to be overlooked.
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A The maximization problem and first order con-
ditions
Using the derivations in section 2, the maximization problem to be solved becomes
max
λ,{c1t ,kt,l1t}∞t=0
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(c1,t) + v(l1,t)] (30)
s.t. u′(c1,t) ≥ δ u′(c1,t+1)(1 + (rt+1 − d)(1− τ˜)) for all t (31)
1 + λ
2
c1,t + g + kt − (1− d)kt−1 = F
(
kt−1,
l1,t + f(λ, l1,t)
2
)
for all t (32)
∞∑
t=0
δt [u(λc1,t) + v(f(λ, l1,t))] ≥ U2 (33)
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
u′(c1,t)c1,t + v′(l1,t) l1,t
)
= u′(c1,0) k1,−1(1 + (r0 − d)(1− τk0 )) (34)
∞∑
t=0
δt
(
u′(c1,t)λc1,t +
φ2
φ1
v′(l1,t) f(λ, l1,t)
)
= u′(c1,0) k2,−1(1 + (r0 − d)(1− τk0 )) (35)
letting α,∆1,∆2 be the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints involving discounted sums
(33), (34) and (35), the Lagrangian is given by (16).
The first order conditions for the Lagrangian are:
• for consumption, t > 0:
u′(c1,t) + αλu′(λc1,t) + (∆1 + λ∆2)[u′(c1,t) + u′′(c1,t)c1,t]+
γtu
′′(c1,t)− γt−1u′′(c1,t)(1 + (rt − d)(1− τ˜)) = µt 12(1 + λ)
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• for consumption, t = 0:
u′(c1,0) + αλu′(λc1,0) + (∆1 + λ∆2)[u′(c1,0) + u′′(c1,0)c1,0]−
u′′(c1,0)
(
(∆1k1,−1 +∆2k2,−1)(1 + (r0 − d)(1− τk0 ))+
∆1m1,1 +∆2m2,−1
)
+ γ0u′′(c1,0) = µ0
1 + λ
2
• for labor, t > 0:
v′(l1,t) + αv′(f(λ, l1,t))f ′(λ, l1,t)+
∆1[v′(l1,t) + v′′(l1,t)l1,t] + ∆2
φ2
φ1
[v′(l1,t)f ′(λ, l1,t) + v′′(l1,t)f(λ, l1,t)]−
γt−1u′(c1,t)(1− τ˜)Fk,e(kt−1, et)12(φ1 + φ2f
′(λ, l1,t)) =
−Fe(kt−1, et)12(φ1 + φ2f
′(λ, l1,t))µt
• for labor, t = 0:
v′(l1,0) + αv′(f(λ, l1,0))f ′(λ, l1,0)+
∆1[v′(l1,0) + v′′(l1,0)l1,0] + ∆2
φ2
φ1
[v′(l1,0)f ′(λ, l1,0) + v′′(l1,0)f(λ, l1,0)]−
(∆1k1,−1 +∆2k2,−1)u′(c1,0)Fk,e(kt−1, et)
1
2
(φ1 + φ2f ′(λ, l1,t))(1− τk0 ) =
−Fe(kt−1, et)12(φ1 + φ2f
′(λ, l1,t))µ0
• for capital, t ≥ 0:
µt + γtδu′(c1,t+1)(1− τ˜)Fk,k(kt, et+1) = δµt+1(1 + Fk(kt, et+1)− d)
• for λ:
∞∑
t=0
δt
[
α (u′(λc1,t)c1,t + v′(f(λ, l1,t))fλ(λ, l1,t))+
∆2
(
u′(c1,t)λc1,t +
φ2
φ1
v′(l1,t)fλ(λ, l1,t)
)−
µt
1
2
(
c1,t − Fe(kt−1, et)φ2fλ(λ, l1,t)
)]
= 0
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B Computational strategy: Approximation of the
time path
1. Fix T as the number of periods after which the steady-state is assumed to have been
reached. (We use T = 150.)
2. Propose a 3∗T+3-dimensional vectorX = {k0, ..., kT−1, l0, ..., lT−1, γ0, ..., γT−1,∆1,∆2, λ}.
(This is not the minimal number of variables to be solved for as a fixed point prob-
lems. 2∗T+3 would be sufficient, however, convergence is better if the approximation
errors are spread over a larger number of variables.)
3. With k−1 and g known, find {ct, Fkt, Flt, Fklt, Fkkt} from the resource constraint and
the production function.
4. Calculate {µt} from the FOC for labor.
5. Calculate {γt} from the FOC for consumption, making use of {µt} and the guess for
{γt} from the X-vector. (The guess is plugged into γt−1, γt is backed out.)
6. Form the 3 ∗ T + 3 residual equations to be set to 0:
• The FOC for capital (Euler equation) has to be satisfied. (T equations)
• The vector {γt} has to converge, i.e. old and new guess have to be equal. (T
equations)
• Check for each period whether the constraint on τk is satisfied. If yes, impose
γt = 0. Otherwise, the constraint on capital taxes has to be satisfied with
equality. (T equations)
• The remaining 3 equations come from the present value budget constraints
(PVBC) and the FOC for λ. The discounted sums in the PVBCs are calculated
using the time path of the variables for the first T periods and adding the net
present value of staying in steady-state forever thereafter.
7. Iterate on X to set the residuals to 0. (We use Broyden’s algorithm to solve this
3 ∗ T + 3-dimensional fixed point problem.)
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C Recursive Formulation
Formally, the structure of Marcet & Marimon (1998) does not apply starting at period
t = 0 because the terms grouped in W in the above Lagrangian have some endogenous
variables (labor and consumption) that appear differently in period t = 0 than in all
remaining periods. The model is recursive only after period 0.
Given constants ∆, λ, α it can be shown that a time invariant policy function F

c1t
kt
l1t
γt

= F (kt−1, γt−1) t ≥ 1 (36)
= F0(k−1) t = 0 (37)
gives the solution for any initial value of k−1 and for γ0 = 0. That is, the solution is
recursive after period 1 if the multipliers γ are introduced as co-state variables. The
dependence of F on the ∆’s, α and λ is left implicit here.
To show (36), fix the constants given ∆’s, λ and α, first solve the problem from period
t = 1 onwards
max
{c1t ,kt,l1t}∞t=1
∞∑
t=1
δt
[
u(c1,t) + v(l1,t) + α(u(λc1,t) + v(f(λ, l1,t)))+
∆1( u′(c1,t)c1,t + v′(l1,t) l1,t )+
∆2
(
u′(c1,t)λc1,t +
φ2
φ1
v′(l1,t) l2,t
)
+
γ0u
′(c1,1)(1 + (r1 − d)(1− τ˜))
]
subject to the tax limit for all periods and feasibility, and for fixed values of ∆’s, α, λ, γ0
and k0. Notice that in this problem the series to be found starts at t = 1, and the choices
in period zero are taken as given. Given the optimal choices in period zero for k, γ, we
now consider the maximization for the periods t > 0. Solution of this model is a special
case of the framework in Marcet and Marimon.
Let W (γ0, k0) be the value at the optimum of the objective function of the above
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maximization problem. The dependence on the constants ∆’s, λ and α is left implicit.
Now we solve for the period zero quantities by finding
max
(c10,k0,l10)
u(c1,0) + v(l1,0) + α[u(λc1,0) + v(f(λ, l1,0))]+
∆1[ u′(c1,0)c1,0 + v′(l1,0) l1,0 ]+
∆2
(
u′(c1,0)λc1,0 +
φ2
φ1
v′(l1,0) f(λ, l1,0)
)
+
δW (γ0, k0)
subject to tax limit and feasibility in period zero. It is easy to see that the solution of
this maximizes the original problem by combining the arguments in Chari, Christiano &
Kehoe (1994) and the ones in Marcet & Marimon (1998). Solving this last model gives
rise to the decision function in period zero (37).
D Sensitivity analysis
To check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of parameters we separately vary the
preference parameters, tax rates in the status quo, and heterogeneity in each case leaving
the remaining parameters as in the main calibration. We always find the same qualitative
properties of the optimal policy that we described in section 4. Table D summarizes the
results by reporting the duration of the transition and the revenue share of capital taxes
for the extreme points of the set of POPI plans. The general pattern is that higher risk
aversion, makes the transition longer with a correspondingly higher share of capital taxes
in revenues. Higher initial (and maximum) capital taxes and less heterogeneity (i.e. high
λSQ) make the policy more sensitive to the distribution of welfare gains in the sense that
the difference in duration and revenue share between the two extreme ways of distributing
gains becomes larger.
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Π(capitalist) = 0 Π(worker) = 0
Calibration duration rev. share of τ k duration rev. share of τ k
benchmark 20 24% 10 15%
γc = 0.5 16 21% 9 9%
γc = 2* 18 22% 12 18%
τ kSQ = 0.4 18 16% 12 12%
τ kSQ = 0.65 21 28% 8 15%
τ lSQ = 0.18 20 27% 10 17%
τ lSQ = 0.28 20 21% 10 13%
λSQ = 0.31** 19 24% 10 16%
λSQ = 0.5 21 25% 8 13%
The column entitled ’Calibration’ indicates which parameter has been reset to which value.
All other parameters are as in the benchmark case. The subscript ’SQ’ refers to the status
quo before the reform.
* In this case, like with an inelastic labor supply, the policy that has the maximum utility
gain for the worker still leaves the capitalist with a strict welfare gain. We therefore report
this policy rather than the one that would have Π(capitalist) = 0.
** Here heterogeneity parameters correspond to the two most extreme groups in GMV.
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis
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Figure 1: The frontier of Pareto improving feasible equilibria in terms of welfare gains (in %)
in the model with fixed labor supply.
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Figure 2: The frontier of feasible equilibria in terms of welfare gains (in %) in the baseline
model and with transfers
The point α = 1 corresponds to the policy under the so called ’veil of ignorance’.
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Figure 3: A typical time path for capital taxes
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Figure 4: Properties of different POPI programs (baseline model)
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Figure 5: The time paths of selected variables for three POPI plans in the baseline model.
(Time is in years.)
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Figure 6: The evolution of agents’ welfare and wealth over time (typical paths)
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